Semiotisches dreieck nach charles sanders peirce biography

Signo: Theoretical Semiotics on the Web. All things have become signs in the water's reflection. Follow us on. Share this page. News and Actuality. Oft wird auf das Modell von Ogden und Richards verwiesen, es gibt aber verschiedene Varianten. Um diesen Beitrag zu verstehen, solltest du schon das Zeichenmodell von de Saussure kennen, denn das semiotische Dreieck baut darauf auf.

Der Unterschied zwischen dem Modell des sprachlichen Zeichens von de Saussure und dem semiotischen Dreieck ist, dass eine weitere Ebene dazugekommen ist. In it Peirce returns to the basic sign structure we gave above and by paying close attention to those elements of signs and the various interactions between them gives what seems to be an extensive account of signification, and an exhaustive typology of signs far beyond the range of his early account of the s.

Recall that Peirce thought signs signify their objects not through all their features, but in virtue of some particular feature. By , for reasons related to his work on phenomenology, Peirce thought the central features of sign-vehicles could be divided into three broad areas, and consequently, that signs could be classified accordingly. This division depends upon whether sign-vehicles signify in virtue of qualities, existential facts, or conventions and laws.

Further, signs with these sign-vehicles are classified as qualisigns , sinsigns , and legisigns respectively. Examples of signs whose sign-vehicle relies upon a quality are difficult to imagine, but a particularly clear example, used by David Savan, is this:. There are many elements to the colored chip as a sign, but it is only its color that matters to its ability to signify.

Any sign whose sign-vehicle relies, as with this example, on simple abstracted qualities is called a qualisign. An example of a sign whose sign-vehicle uses existential facts is smoke as a sign for fire; the causal relation between the fire and smoke allows the smoke to act as a signifier. Other cases are the molehill example used earlier, and temperature as a sign for a fever.

Any sign whose sign-vehicle relies upon existential connections with its object is named, by Peirce, a sinsign. And finally, the third kind of sign is one whose crucial signifying element is primarily due to convention, habit or law. Typical examples would be traffic lights as sign of priority, and the signifying capability of words; these sign-vehicles signify in virtue of the conventions surrounding their use.

Peirce calls signs whose sign-vehicles function in this way legisigns. Just as Peirce thought signs could be classified according to whether their sign-vehicles function in virtue of qualities, existential facts, or conventions and laws, he thought signs were similarly classifiable according to how their object functioned in signification. That is to say, the nature of the object constrains the nature of the sign in terms of what successful signification requires.

Again, Peirce thought the nature of these constraints fell into three broad classes: qualitative, existential or physical, and conventional and law-like. Further, if the constraints of successful signification require that the sign reflect qualitative features of the object, then the sign is an icon. If the constraints of successful signification require that the sign utilize some existential or physical connection between it and its object, then the sign is an index.

And finally, if successful signification of the object requires that the sign utilize some convention, habit, or social rule or law that connects it with its object, then the sign is a symbol. This is a trichotomy with which we are already familiar from the early account, and indeed, the examples of icons, indices, and symbols are largely the same as before: icons are portraits and paintings, indices are natural and causal signs, symbols are words and so on.

There are, however, additional instances, for example, icons include diagrams used in geometrical reasoning, indices include pointing fingers and proper names, and symbols including broad speech acts like assertion and judgment, all of which suggests a considerable broadening of this trichotomy. It is well worth noting, though, that by Peirce was aware that it would be hard, if not impossible, to find any pure instances of icons and indices.

Rather, he began to suspect that icons and indices were always partly symbolic or conventional. To try to capture this, Peirce experimented with some additional terminology and types of icon and index. These he called the hypo-icon see CP2. As with the sign-vehicle and the object, Peirce thought we could classify signs in terms of their relation with their interpretant.

Again, he identifies three categories according to which feature of the relationship with its object a sign uses in generating an interpretant. Further, as with the classification of the sign in terms of the sign-vehicle and the object, Peirce identifies qualities, existential facts, or conventional features as the basis for classifying the sign in terms of its interpretant.

If the sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding of the sign upon the qualitative features it employs in signifying its object, then the sign is classified as a rheme. Whenever we understand a sign in terms of qualities it suggests its object may have, we generate an interpretant that qualifies its sign as a rheme. If, on the other hand, a sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding of the sign upon the existential features it employs in signifying an object, then the sign is a dicent.

And finally, if a sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding on some conventional or law-like features employed in signifying the object, then the sign is a delome , or as Peirce most frequently, but confusingly, calls them, arguments. Further, just as we can think of a rheme as an unsaturated predicate, and a dicent as a proposition, we can think of the delome as an argument or rule of inference.

Our ability to understand a sign in terms of its place in some pattern of reasoning and system of signs enables us to derive information from it by deductive reasoning or make conjectures about it by inductive and abductive reasoning. So, whenever we come to understand a sign as focusing our attention upon some conventional feature of its relationship with object, that is, enabling us to understand the sign as part of a rule governed system of knowledge and signs etc.

Peirce believed that the three elements, and the respective classifications they imposed upon signs, could be combined to give a complete list of sign types. That is, since a sign has a sign-vehicle it can be classified as either a qualisign, a sinsign, or legisign. Additionally, since that sign has an object it can be classified as either an icon, an index, or a symbol.

And finally, since that sign will also determine an interpretant it can be classified as either a rheme, a dicent, or a delome. Each sign is then classifiable as some combination of each of its three elements, that is, as either one of the three types of sign-vehicle, plus one of the three types of object, plus one of the three types of interpretant.

The rules for the permissible combinations are actually quite simple so long as we bear two things in mind. First, types of each element are classifiable as either a quality, an existential fact, or a convention. That is, across the three elements of a sign, there are three types deriving from qualities the qualisign, the icon, and the rheme , three deriving from existential facts, the sinsign, the index, and the dicent , and three deriving from conventions the legisign, the symbol, and the delome.

Second, the classification of the interpretant depends upon the classification of the object, which in turn depends upon the classification of the sign-vehicle. The rules that determine permissible classifications, then, are that if an element is classified as a quality, then its dependent element may only be a classified as a quality. If an element is classified as an existential fact, then its dependent element may be classified as either an existential fact, or a quality.

And if an element is classified as a convention, then its dependent element may be classified as either a convention, an existential fact, or a quality. This leaves us with ten permissible combinations between a sign-vehicle, object and interpretant, and so ten possible kinds of signs. They look something like this:.

Semiotisches dreieck nach charles sanders peirce biography

These ten types of sign are simply called after the combination of their elements: an ordinary proposition is a dicentic-symbolic-legisign , a spontaneous cry a rhematic-indexical-sinsign , and so on. Despite its apparent completeness and complexity, however, Peirce soon began rethinking his account of signs. Over the final years of his life, he introduced further complexities and nuance to his semiotics.

There seem to be two reasons for this. First, Peirce was geographically and intellectually isolated and his main outlet was correspondence with the English woman, Lady Victoria Welby. This seems to have given Peirce a willing and sympathetic audience for his developing ideas on signs. The second reason seems to have been his growing appreciation of the connections between the semiotic process and the process of inquiry.

Peirce always thought of his philosophy in a systematic and architectonic way. However, around , an application for funding to the Carnegie Institute saw him express more clearly the connections between different aspects of his philosophy. The application failed, but Peirce had returned to thinking about the place of sign theory in his broader philosophy.

The main impact here was that he came to see sign theory speculative grammar as more clearly connected to the logic of scientific discovery methodeutic and consequently, as being more central to his account of inquiry. This kind of thinking lead Peirce to reassess his account of signs and sign structure: the connection between the process of inquiry and sign chains led Peirce to notice subtleties and nuances that had previously been transparent to him.

In particular, it led him to see chains of signs as tending towards a definite but idealized end rather than progressing ad infinitum. Since at the idealized end of inquiry we have a complete understanding of some object, there need be no further interpretant of that object; our understanding cannot be developed any further. The former he calls the immediate object , and the later he calls the dynamic object.

Hookway , The dynamic object is, in some senses, the object that generates a chain of signs. The aim of a sign chain is to arrive at a full understanding of an object and so assimilate that object into the system of signs. Perhaps there is a fuel gauge attached to the tank, or perhaps the tank makes a distinctive sound when we strike it and so on.

But, despite these various signs, the object underlying them all is the actual level of fuel in the petroleum tank; this is the dynamic object. The immediate object, then, is not some additional object distinct from the dynamic object but is merely some informationally incomplete facsimile of the dynamic object generated at some interim stage in a chain of signs.

Returning to the petroleum tank example, when we strike the tank, the tone that it emits which functions as the sign-vehicle represents to us that the tank is not full but it does not tell us the precise level of fuel. The immediate object, then, is a less-than-full-tank. Clearly, the immediate and dynamic objects of a sign are intimately linked and Peirce consistently describes and introduces the two together.

See CP 4. However, the connection between the two is most clear when we consider the connections between sign chains and inquiry. The dynamic object is, as we have suggested, the goal and end point that drives the semiotic process, and the immediate object is our grasp of that object at any point in that process. Ransdell, for instance, says:.

Just as with the object s of the sign, the parallels between semiotic and inquiry result in a similar division of interpretants. As a chain of signs moves towards a final end there are different interpretants playing different but important roles. Peirce identifies three different ways in which we grasp the way a sign stands for an object.

Charles S. Selected Writings on Semiotics, — Charles Sanders 28 April The New Elements of Mathematics. OCLC Handbook of Computer Game Studies. MIT Press. Introduction to Communication Studies. Reprinted CP 5. Reprinted CP 4. Archived at the Wayback Machine. Reprinted in the Collected Papers , vol. Criticism and some suggestions for improvements.

Peirce , v. Frithjof Dau called it "the strong version" of proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis. John F. Sowa in the same discussion claimed that an explanation in terms of conceptual graphs is sufficiently convincing about the Reduction Thesis for those without the time to understand what Peirce was saying. In W. Quine claimed to prove the reducibility of larger predicates to dyadic predicates, in Quine, W.

He affirmed the same view more than 35 years later see EP , Reprinted CP 2. Ten quotes on collateral observation from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be viewed here. Note: Ransdell's quotes from CP 8. Peirce v. Something black is something embodying blackness , pointing us back to the abstraction. The quality black amounts to reference to its own pure abstraction, the ground blackness.

The question is not merely of noun the ground versus adjective the quality , but rather of whether we are considering the black ness as abstracted away from application to an object, or instead as so applied for instance to a stove. Yet note that Peirce's distinction here is not that between a property-general and a property-individual a trope.

Regarding the ground, cf. Philosophical Writings of Peirce. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. XVI, n. The manuscript can be viewed and magnified by clicking on image here at the Lyris Peirce Archive. Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Culture, Theory and Critique. Further reading [ edit ]. External links [ edit ]. Hidden categories: CS1 German-language sources de Webarchive template wayback links Articles with short description Short description is different from Wikidata Wikipedia articles needing context from July All Wikipedia articles needing context All pages needing cleanup Articles containing Spanish-language text Articles containing French-language text Articles containing Portuguese-language text Articles containing Italian-language text Articles containing German-language text.

Toggle the table of contents. Semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce. Part of a series on. Abductive reasoning Fallibilism Pragmaticism as maxim as theory of truth Community of inquiry. Indexicality Interpretant Semiosis Sign relation Universal rhetoric. Biosemiotics Cognitive semiotics Computational semiotics Literary semiotics Semiotics of culture Social semiotics.

Commutation test Paradigmatic analysis Syntagmatic analysis. Morris Charles S. Firstness [ 31 ]. Reference to a ground a ground is a pure abstraction of a quality [ 32 ]. Essentially monadic the quale, in the sense of the such , [ 33 ] which has the quality. Secondness [ 34 ]. Thirdness [ 35 ]. Phenomenological category : Sign is distinguished by phenomenological category of I Rhematic Iconic Qualisign.

V Rhematic Iconic Legisign. X Argument Symbol Legisign. II Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. VI Rhematic Indexical Legisign.